{"id":599974,"date":"2026-07-23T18:36:55","date_gmt":"2026-07-23T15:36:55","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/korabelov.info\/2026\/07\/599974\/gmail-drafts-a-russian-wife-and-fleeing-the-front-sailor-sentenced-to-15-years-for-state-treason\/"},"modified":"2026-07-23T18:36:58","modified_gmt":"2026-07-23T15:36:58","slug":"gmail-drafts-a-russian-wife-and-fleeing-the-front-sailor-sentenced-to-15-years-for-state-treason","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/korabelov.info\/en\/2026\/07\/599974\/gmail-drafts-a-russian-wife-and-fleeing-the-front-sailor-sentenced-to-15-years-for-state-treason\/","title":{"rendered":"Gmail drafts, a Russian wife and fleeing the front: sailor sentenced to 15 years for state treason"},"content":{"rendered":"

The Korabelnyi District Court of the city of Mykolaiv<\/strong> found<\/a> a serviceman of the Naval Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine guilty of treason and sentenced him to 15 years of imprisonment<\/strong> with confiscation of all his property. The verdict was delivered by a panel of 3 judges<\/strong> on 19 June 2026<\/strong>. The name of the convicted person is redacted in the published court decision.<\/p>\n

The man was a citizen of Ukraine, had no prior convictions, was married and served under contract with the rank of seaman. Since 5 June 2019<\/strong> he had been serving in a military unit of the Naval Forces of the AFU, and at the time of exposure he held the position of senior rifleman of the guard platoon of the guard company of the guard battalion.<\/p>\n

According to the circumstances established by the court, the serviceman lived in Ochakiv<\/strong> with his wife \u2014 a citizen of the Russian Federation<\/strong>. The couple met online in 2019<\/strong> and married in 2021<\/strong>. After the start of the full-scale Russian invasion, the man continued to serve in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.<\/p>\n

In the spring of 2024<\/strong> the serviceman learned of a possible redeployment of his unit to the Kherson direction. He told his wife about this, and she began looking for ways to transfer him to another unit, get him discharged, or arrange for him to leave Ukraine.<\/p>\n

According to the case materials, at first the wife, through her mother who lived in Moscow<\/strong>, contacted a man who during the first interrogation she named as an officer of the Russian FSB. He questioned the serviceman about foreign troops in Ochakiv<\/strong> and the situation on Maisky Island, but after receiving no useful answers stopped communicating.<\/p>\n

In May 2024<\/strong> the wife\u2019s father gave her the contact of another man \u2014 a citizen of the Russian Federation who used a pseudonym on Telegram. He claimed he could help the serviceman leave Ukraine, but instead began collecting military information.<\/p>\n

The Russian provided the couple with a login and password for a specially created Google email account. For secrecy the correspondents were not to send messages: they left messages in the Drafts folder and deleted them after reading. In this way they tried to hide the very fact of exchanging information.<\/p>\n

No later than 17 May 2024<\/strong> the handler gave the serviceman his first task. He demanded that he report his place of service, biographical data, information about his immediate commanders, their places of residence and whereabouts, and also name servicemen of the unit who had relatives in Russia.<\/p>\n

The court found that the serviceman accessed the mailbox from his OnePlus phone and left a detailed autobiography in the Drafts. He stated that he was born and educated in Ochakiv<\/strong>, graduated from a vocational school in Mykolaiv<\/strong>, worked in a supermarket, and in 2019<\/strong> signed a contract with the Armed Forces of Ukraine.<\/p>\n

In addition to personal information, the seaman named the commander of the military unit and two of his deputies. He did not provide their places of residence, saying that such data are hidden even from unit personnel. The serviceman also stated that he did not know other fighters with relatives in Russia and considered himself the only such serviceman in the unit.<\/p>\n

The unit\u2019s command later confirmed to the investigators that up-to-date information about the commander and his two deputies had not been officially published in open sources. The court noted that even partially known information could help the enemy verify, confirm, or update intelligence data.<\/p>\n

After receiving the first message, the Russian handler noted that he was taking the transmitted information “into processing”, and set a new task. The serviceman was required to describe his official duties in detail, name the objects he guards, disclose their locations, and the security and defense system of the military unit. The man did not have time to complete the second task. His unlawful activity was exposed by employees of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) on 21 May 2024<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

During a search of the apartment in Ochakiv<\/strong> law enforcement officers seized the phones of the serviceman and his wife. The memory of the OnePlus phone used by the seaman contained screenshots of correspondence with the Russian interlocutor.<\/p>\n

In particular, the handler asked the serviceman whether the situation had changed and whether the front was moving in his direction. The man replied that there were no changes. In another fragment they discussed the seaman\u2019s duty schedule to determine times when it would be safer to use the shared email. The phone also contained fragments of the autobiography that matched the Drafts message. Investigators recorded correspondence between the serviceman and his wife about the covert exchange of information and a possible joint departure.<\/p>\n

Before their exposure the couple sent some belongings and computer equipment to Russia. According to the accused, the wife had to leave Ukraine permanently due to the expiration of her documents. On 20 May 2024<\/strong> he drove her to Odesa<\/strong>, from where she was heading to the border with Moldova<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

The woman was stopped during border control. As an SBU officer testified in court, her phone contained correspondence indicating contacts with representatives of the enemy side, attempts to recruit Ukrainian citizens, and the collection of military information.<\/p>\n

At trial the serviceman pleaded not guilty. He insisted that the correspondence with the Russian was mostly conducted by his wife and that he allegedly refused to transfer military information. According to his version, his wife knew his autobiography, and information about the commanders could be seen in his military ID.<\/p>\n

The seaman also claimed that he did not plan to switch to the enemy side, had no intention of passing on important information, and considered leaving only to Moldova<\/strong> or one of the European countries. The Russian interlocutor\u2019s questions about the military unit allegedly worried him. The court treated these explanations critically. The panel took into account materials from covert investigative actions, email data, results of phone examinations, conclusions of computer-technical expertises, information from mobile operators, video recordings of the search, and witness testimonies.<\/p>\n

The court separately examined the wife\u2019s testimony. During the first interrogation she stated that she gave the serviceman the login, password and the handler\u2019s instructions, after which the serviceman himself provided his autobiography and information about the unit\u2019s command. Later the woman changed part of her testimony, referring to psychological pressure.<\/p>\n

At the same time, the court noted that the key circumstances in both versions remained the same: the wife provided the husband with access to the mail, the Russian interlocutor requested military information, and the answers about the autobiography and the commanders were given by the serviceman himself. During the proceedings the convicted man\u2019s wife was already outside Ukraine. According to the man, she returned to Russia.<\/p>\n

The prosecution accused the seaman of treason in two forms: assisting a representative of a foreign state in conducting subversive activities against Ukraine and the so-called “intellectual defection to the enemy”. The court found proven the assistance to a representative of the aggressor state. The panel noted that the serviceman understood the nature of the questions, was aware of the danger of transmitting the data, and consciously used a covert method of communication.<\/p>\n

At the same time the court did not uphold the formulation about the “intellectual defection to the enemy” because there was no evidence of an actual defection of the man to Russian forces. The intent to obtain help in fleeing Ukraine alone did not prove this separate form of treason. The court did not identify mitigating or aggravating circumstances. At the same time the panel took into account the absence of remorse, attempts to shift responsibility onto his wife, and the fact that the cooperation ended not voluntarily but only after the intervention of the SBU.<\/p>\n

The serviceman was found guilty under Part 2 of Article 111 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine<\/strong> and sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment<\/strong> with confiscation of all property.<\/p>\n

Time spent in custody will be credited to the sentence from 31 May 2024<\/strong>, at the rate of one day of pre-trial detention for one day of imprisonment. The convicted man was also ordered to pay the state 15,145 hryvnias 60 kopecks<\/strong> in expert examination costs. The OnePlus phone was left under seizure for subsequent confiscation, while the Samsung Galaxy that belonged to the wife was ordered returned to its owner. The man was remanded in custody until the verdict takes legal effect. The decision text states that the verdict may be appealed to the Mykolaiv Court of Appeal within 30 days<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

Previously we wrote:<\/strong><\/p>\n