{"id":577863,"date":"2026-03-20T12:06:52","date_gmt":"2026-03-20T10:06:52","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/korabelov.info\/2026\/03\/577863\/ukrainian-armed-forces-successes-in-the-south-have-complicated-russia-s-plans-isw\/"},"modified":"2026-03-20T12:06:55","modified_gmt":"2026-03-20T10:06:55","slug":"ukrainian-armed-forces-successes-in-the-south-have-complicated-russia-s-plans-isw","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/korabelov.info\/en\/2026\/03\/577863\/ukrainian-armed-forces-successes-in-the-south-have-complicated-russia-s-plans-isw\/","title":{"rendered":"Ukrainian Armed Forces' successes in the south have complicated Russia's plans \u2014 ISW"},"content":{"rendered":"

The successes of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the Oleksandrivka direction in the south have forced the Russian command to balance between mutually exclusive operational-tactical objectives, as stated in the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) assessment of 19 March 2026<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

ISW notes that the competition of tasks across several sections of the front has already disrupted Russia\u2019s preparations for the spring\u2013summer 2026<\/strong> campaign. You can read more about this in the analysts\u2019 fresh report published on the organization\u2019s website at the link<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets points out that the forces available to the Russian troops are insufficient to, in the framework of a single offensive, simultaneously take Orikhiv<\/strong> and advance toward Zaporizhzhia<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

In his opinion, the Kremlin will likely have to pull reserves from the Kherson<\/strong> direction, since simultaneously the Russian Federation is attempting to attack the lines of the Fortified Belt, pressure Dobropillia<\/strong> and Kupiansk<\/strong>, and form a \u201cbuffer zone\u201d in the Kharkiv<\/strong> and Sumy<\/strong> regions.<\/p>\n

Such simultaneous pressure creates several dilemmas for the adversary: an advance on Dobropillia<\/strong> forces the redeployment of resources from other focal points, weakening them; even an intensification of mobilization does not solve the personnel deficit, because there is no time to properly prepare recruits for the summer phase of combat; moreover, there is currently no evidence of significant force transfers to the west and south of Orikhiv<\/strong>, without which it is impossible to mount a large-scale operation against Zaporizhzhia<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

ISW analysts add that the situation on the northern sector also does not confirm the Russian Federation\u2019s readiness for a major offensive: a representative of a Ukrainian brigade from the Kramatorsk<\/strong> area reported low attack intensity and an absence of concentrations of heavy equipment, indicating an inability to prepare a strike against Ukraine\u2019s fortress belt.<\/p>\n

Overall, ISW notes, the dispersion of Russian efforts \u2014 from assaults in the south to the creation of \u201cbuffer zones\u201d in the east \u2014 combined with personnel and logistical constraints complicates the adoption of a single operational concept for the spring\u2013summer 2026<\/strong> period.<\/p>\n

Previously we wrote:<\/h3>\n